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Executive Summary 
In this paper, I compare the realities of joint ventures, using one case, to several 
well-known, academic frameworks related to joint venture development. Most joint 
venture frameworks identify that the beginning of any joint venture is the formation 
stage. Within this formation stage there is a transition from an informal phase, in which 
potential joint venture partners' motives and goals are discussed, to a more formal phase 
in which firms begin to work towards signing a joint venture agreement. As the fOlmation 
stage concludes with the signing of joint venture agreement, the adjustment stage begins. 
The adj ustment stage is the process of those each parent film implementing the strategic 
business plan of the joint venture and beginning operational activities. As the adjustment 
stage comes to a close, many joint ventures enter a phase refened to as the evaluation 
stage. During this final stage of joint venture development, partners commonly perfOlm 
an evaluation of the alliance in order to assess the degree of fulfillment of original joint 
venture strategies and goals. The focus of this paper will be on the formation and 
adjustment stages. 
After joint venture frameworks have been established, the focus of the paper turns 
to applying the model to an actual joint venture between two travel center operators, Fuel 
Stop and Gas Co. I will describe these firms' process of joint venture development and 
then compare their experiences with the established frameworks of joint venture 
development. 
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Introduction to the Joint Venture 
The joint venture has become an increasingly popular type of business 
organization not only in the United States, but globally. Because of its usefulness in 
creating new businesses, entering previously un-reached markets, diversifying risks, and 
obtaining new technologies, joint ventures have helped to form some of the world's most 
successful enterprises. Examples of successful joint ventures are DuPont-Dow, Boeing-
Lockheed Martin, Fuji-Xerox, and Hewlett Packard-Oracle. As two or more firms agree 
to combine operational and managerial strengths within a strategic alliance, an 
autonomous business unit is created that offers each company synergies and is usually 
focused on a specific market. The joint venture differs from other newly formed business 
entities in that it can be in full operation very quickly with less associated risks as 
compared to a start-up venture. Moreover, because each partner is usually a viable 
business unit, they have the potential to dedicate valuable capital, market knowledge, and 
management expertise to the joint venture. These resources would usually not be 
available to other forms of new businesses (Hartz, 1988). 
Alternatives to joint ventures include mergers and acquisitions, franchise and/or 
licensing agreements, and cooperative agreements. While these business forms offer 
some positive attributes, the joint venture structure is usually superior in areas of risk 
reduction, synergy exploitation, market development, and image protection (Competition, 
1986). With an increased focus on efficiency, diversification, and globalization in the 
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world's business markets, the joint venture can be a profitable means of business for 
many firms. 
Framework of Joint Venture Development 
To better understand the process of fonning a joint venture, we must first observe 
existing frameworks of joint venture development. Based on the research of Bettina 
Buchel in her article published in the Journal of Management Studies, "Framework of 
Joint Venture Development", three distinct developmental stages are commonly 
observed. Phases of formation, adjustment, and evaluation are frequently experienced in 
the early stages of a joint venture between two or more finns. Moreover, Buchel 
concludes that these stages are characterized by periods of converging and diverging 
opinions and outlooks from the respective venture partners (Buchel, 2000). 
Formation Stage. At the beginning of any joint venture is the fonnation stage. 
There are two parts to this stage: an informal process in which partner's motives are 
examined internally followed by a more formal process in which managers at firms begin 
to work towards signing a joint venture agreement. It is the degree to which the partners 
agree to the roles, responsibilities, and motives of each other that determines the 
likelihood that an agreement will be reached and a joint venture pursued (Buchel, 2000). 
The infonnal phase of the fonnation stage is characterized by each firm focusing on their 
internal perspectives. Motives for entering a co-operative agreement are identified and 
examined as each finn is "focusing on its own strategic intent independent of the intent of 
the other" (Buchel, 2000: 646). 
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At this point in negotiations, each firm may be committed to furthering the 
agreement; however, the particular motives and intents of the respective companies may 
not be disclosed to the others. The ambiguity that commonly exists during this informal 
phase should not be seen as an absolute negative though. In fact, many times a firm 
agrees to continue negotiations without even reaching a consensus on their motives for 
entering the joint venture. Gray contends that often stakeholders negotiate issues of 
legitimacy and reach consensus about possibilities of co-operation, yet the actual motives 
are not necessarily mentioned or agreed upon. This flexibility keeps all opportunities 
viable, while allowing the firms to proceed with formal negotiations. 
As each firm decides to pursue continued negotiations, the formation stage 
evolves into a more formal phase. This phase is characterized by each firm reaching a 
contractual agreement by negotiating toward a consensual strategic intent. During the 
formal phase, teams are formed by each partner to facilitate "a congruent understanding 
of the goals and tasks of the joint venture" (Buchel, 2000). These teams are responsible 
for identifying all strategic intents, discussing potential issues of conflict, and developing 
objectives for the venture. When each partner agrees upon the responsibilities and intents 
of the other( s), a formal agreement outlining the strategic alliance can be reached. 
Adjustment Stage. While the formation stage is necessary for partners in the joint 
venture to identify motives, define scope, and reach a formal agreement, the adjustment 
stage is the process of those firms implementing the strategic business plan and 
beginning operational activities. The adjustment stage begins after the formal joint 
venture agreement has been signed. It is during this period that cyclical phases of 
divergence and convergence are most commonly present. Divergence simply means the 
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development of differing views from each partner concerning operational or managerial 
issues, while convergence is the process of resolving these conflicts. It is the task of each 
partners' organizational team to effectively deal with these issues while working to 
implement the structural basis of the new entity. As Buchel states, "This involves 
interpreting events, developing frameworks for understanding and jointly deciding upon 
the next action steps" (Buchel, 2000: 648). Divergence occurs during this period, as Daft 
and Weick (1984) contend, because each firm's group members relate their past 
experiences, established ideals, and corporate cultures to the current joint venture. 
"These different belief structures influence the interpretation of events and determine the 
area of conflict emergence" (Buchel, 2000: 649). 
Evaluation Stage. As the adjustment stage comes to a close, many joint ventures 
enter a phase referred to as the evaluation stage. Partners commonly perform an 
evaluation of the alliance in order to assess "the partnership in terms of the degree of 
fulfillment of parental expectations, deviations from the original business plan, or degree 
of equitable contributions" (Buchel, 2000: 653). A period of evaluation usually arises 
due to increased conflict over operational or managerial issues. When this conflict, or 
divergence, reaches a certain threshold, one or more of the partners will call for an 
evaluation of the joint venture and its operations. At this point, the partners in the joint 
agreement have become an entwined entity and are dependent upon each other for 
support. Robert Spekman contends that during this stage in a joint venture's 
development "managers focus on staying the course and adapting the direction of the 
alliance to reflect both internal and external pressures" (Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy, 
Forbes, 1996: 351). Because there is a high potential for conflict in any joint venture, 
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many firms agree to establish a systematic process of review in which both partners 
complete periodic evaluations to determine the state of the joint venture (Spekman, et aI., 
1996). 
For the remainder of this paper, the focus will be upon the earlier stages of joint 
venture development. This analysis will include listing possible motives for firms 
wishing to form a strategic alliance, coverage of potential effects that a joint venture 
would have on respective partners, and more detailed discussions concerning the 
formation and adjustment phases of the developing joint venture. These topics will be 
covered in greater detail, because of the particularly strong effects they have concerning 
the success of the joint venture. 
Formation Stage: Motives for Joint Ventures 
This section will discuss some of the strategic motives that would lead firms to 
form a joint venture. This analysis will also include reasoning behind these motives and 
the potential financial effects of joint ventures on their respective firms. While potential 
motives for pursuing a joint venture with another firm are numerous, they can be 
classified into three major subgroups: resource-driven joint ventures, market-driven joint 
ventures, and risk-driven joint ventures (Wille, 1988). 
Joint ventures that are motivated by one or more firm's desire to obtain financing, 
technology, or operating techniques that are otherwise unavailable, are classified as 
resource-driven joint ventures. This occurs when, "one parent lacks one or more of the 
essential ingredients needed to exploit a given market opportunity in a timely or 
profitable manner" (Hartz, 1988: 1). Many times, a particular firm may possess the 
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technological and operational capabilities to undergo a value-adding project, yet lack 
sufficient capital needed to finance the project's continuation. In this case, an alliance 
with another, well financed, firm could lead to the project being accepted. "By pooling 
resources with other finns, they may find it easier to finance a project or to obtain venture 
capital due to their increased ability to repay loans ... " (Competition 1986; 23). 
Another resource-driven motive leading to a joint agreement involves one firm 
desiring a complementary technology that is currently possessed by another company. 
Many times, large, well-capitalized firms will "take minority positions in small 
technology-based companies in order to ensure future access to the fruits of the firm's 
creative efforts" (Wille, 1988: 7-8). By adding the technology used to produce goods to 
established marketing and distribution channels, firms gain an efficient competitive 
advantage. Finally, resource-driven joint ventures are sometimes motivated by 
organizational or operational techniques. In some cases, firms merely need the 
managerial experience and expertise to fully realize the potential rewards from their 
strengths in other functional areas such as manufacturing capabilities (Wille, 1988). 
A firm's decision to enter into a joint venture agreement can also be motivated by 
market-driven factors. "Although a firm may have the capability of producing a given 
product or service, a joint venture can afford it certain market advantages which it would 
not otherwise enjoy" (Wille, 1988: 9). Motivations including establishing an increased 
market presence, obtaining economies of scale, and raising entry barriers for potential 
competitors are common examples of market-driven motives for pursuing a joint venture. 
Often, firms wish to increase their relative influence in a particular market by establishing 
a greater presence. With this increased market share, partners in the joint venture are also 
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able to avoid competition with each other and create high entry barriers for potential 
competitors while obtaining economies of scale within their industry (Competition, 
1986). 
Risk-driven joint ventures can be described as agreements that are motivated by 
reducing the costs or risks of a certain project. Joint ventures with risk-driven motives 
usually fall into one of two categories; they are established to share the costs of a large 
production project, or are formed to defray some of the risks involved in large research 
and development projects. Firms that form research joint ventures are usually concerned 
with reducing the risk of competitors imitating their products after their introduction, 
while joint ventures based on reducing the risks of production are common in extractive 
industries like mining or oil-drilling, where set-up costs and the variability of returns are 
very high (Wille, 1988). 
Components of the Formation Stage 
The discussion will now focus on identifying phases commonly observed in the 
formation period of a joint venture. Moreover, we will distinguish specific aspects that 
characterize a successful joint venture agreement. In the article "Creating Strategic 
Alliances which Endure", published in Long Range Planning, the authors contend that 
within the formation stage there are three distinct phases: anticipation, engagement, and 
valuation (Spekman et ai., 1996: 356, et ai., 1996). 
Anticipation. During the anticipation phase, managers of the prospective partners 
begin to share "a vision of competitive advantage which could be achieved only in 
partnership" (Spekman, et aI., 1996: 354). This period of high motivation and 
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preliminary discussions occurs during the "informal" phase discussed earlier in this 
paper. It is common during this stage for senior managers to possess a vision for the joint 
venture and to begin to impress that vision throughout their respective firms. Research 
shows that these visions were driven by strategic motives and that the success of the joint 
venture was to the degree that these visions were uniformly accepted (Spekman, et aI., 
1996). 
Engagement. The next phase observed by Spekman was a period of engagement 
between the partners of the joint venture. During this stage, managers of each firm begin 
to share a common vision for the alliance and work toward forming joint strategies to 
accomplish this purpose (Spekman, et aI., 1996). Understanding and respecting the 
values of your partner becomes critical during this stage. As one manager in the 
Spekman text stated, "Two things are critical: understanding your partner's corporate 
culture and corporate strategy" (Spekman, et aI., 1996: 352). The inability of each firm 
to be sensitive to their partner's established culture and values will be detrimental to the 
success of the joint venture. 
Valuation. The final phase of the formation stage, as observed by Spekman, is a 
period of valuation. At this point, managers from each firm begin to analyze the actual 
worth of the joint venture to each company. Teams representing each partner negotiate 
each firm's responsibility to the new entity and form realistic goals for the joint venture 
to accomplish. During this phase, which would fall into the formal phase of the 
formation stage proposed by Buchel, firms focus on internal issues relating to the joint 
venture and determine possible gains from the alliance. As this valuation period 
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continues, managers must strive to clearly communicate the potential benefits of the joint 
venture for their firm (Spekman, et al., 1996). 
Components of the Adjustment Stage 
Following the completion of the formation stage, the development of the joint 
venture experiences significant change. As the joint venture enters a period of 
adjustment, each partner begins to define the "scope, domain, and operational purposes of 
the alliance" (Spekman, et al., 1996). At this time, structural frameworks and approved 
processes begin to take shape within the new entity. While the focus in the formation 
stage was on internal motives and potential benefits, during the adjustment stage, 
management's attention is directed toward operations, task delegation, and structural 
integration between all involved partners. As the joint venture begins operations, 
committees from each firm have the responsibility "to both oversee the evolution of the 
joint working arrangements and to model the range of acceptable behaviors between 
partners" (Spekman, et al., 1996: 355). Members of these committees must effectively 
translate the vision of senior management into an operational reality. In some cases, 
firms entering into a joint venture elect to employ consultants to assist their efforts during 
this coordination period. Communication becomes a very important issue during the 
coordination phase, as effective communication "signals commitment" from one firm to 
another and reduces the likelihood of confusion. 
Within the adjustment stage, Spekman argues, there is another shift, from 
coordination to investment. It is at this point that each firm must provide "financial, 
human, physical and intellectual capital to the alliance" (Spekman, et al., 1996: 355). 
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Partners of the joint venture must now commit valuable company resources to realize the 
strategic goals of the cooperative agreement. This is a watershed event in the 
development of the joint venture as it becomes difficult to "re-shape, re-configure, or 
even re-calibrate the scope and direction of the alliance" after investment in the joint 
venture is made (Spekrnan, et aI., 1996: 356). We will now transition to from an 
overview of academic frameworks to a real case of joint venture. 
Introduction to Fuel Stop and Gas Co. Joint Venture 
The joint venture that will be used to compare to the academic framework is 
between Fuel Stop and GasCo. (Footnote: This is a real and new joint venture. 
However, it has been requested by the companies that their names be disguised for 
disclosure issues.) Thisjoint venture will combine 144 of Gas Co.'s travel center 
locations across the nation and 94 locations from Fuel Stop. A travel center is a retail 
diesel and gas fueling station that is specifically marketed to interstate travelers like 
distribution companies and trucking firms. The new company is structured as a limited 
liability company, NewCo LLC, owned 50 percent by Fuel Stop and 50 percent by Gas 
Co. Both parties maintain their gasoline and C-store operations through separate entities. 
The new company is an independent entity and the nation's largest travel center chain by 
over 75 units. In addition, NewCo LLC will be a formidable competitor in the nation's 
primary truck traffic region. This 14-state area accounts for nearly two-thirds of the 
truck-borne freight tonnage in the country. Both fim1s will best realize the potential of 
this market by establishing the coast-to-coast network that pelmits them to develop fleet 
accounts with the nation's largest carriers. 
12 
Motives for the Fuel Stop and Gas Co. Joint Venture 
To begin our analysis of the Fuel Stop/Gas Co. joint venture, we will first 
examine the motives for entering the alliance from Fuel Stop's perspective. Fuel Stop 
has long been a regional player in the travel center industry. However, after completing 
market research and recognizing that national carriers would carry more allegiance to a 
fuel and service provider that enjoyed a national presence, Fuel Stop concluded that a 
strategic move toward becoming a national travel center operator was needed. Fuel Stop 
management saw great potential to enhance profits by building an infrastructure that 
could attract the national carrier and regional carrier alike. The underlying premise was 
that if SSA could provide competitive priced-fuel to the national trucking companies as 
well as provide those companies' drivers with efficient, appealing nationwide locations, 
an allegiance would develop and render its existing facilities more opportunity for sales 
growth. 
When the expansion project was in the planning stages, one step taken by Fuel 
Stop was to analyze successful and unsuccessful competitors in an effort to model their 
program to attain the highest profitability with the lowest investment. Ironically, Fuel 
Stop targeted its unit construction to mirror those of Gas Co., a company offering a good 
mix of amenities, services and food offerings without overbuilding its facilities. All in 
all, Fuel Stop planned to spend another $160 million over the next several years in its 20-
unit expansion westward. However, Fuel Stop executive management seized a unique 
opportunity to enter joint venture formation discussions with the company we were trying 
to emulate, Gas Co. 
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One motive for Fuel Stop to enter a joint venture with Gas Co. was the possibility 
of accelerating their ambitious plans for a nationwide travel center network from a 
several-year time horizon to an immediate reality. The proposed joint venture would 
combine 144 of Gas Co.' s travel center locations across the nation and 94 locations from 
Fuel Stop. The joint venture would also allow Fuel Stop to invest substantially less 
capital and incur less risk while enjoying immediate expansion. Fuel Stop also felt that 
Gas Co. was a true industry leader in their management techniques. Since 1988, Gas Co. 
had concentrated on designing a high-performance travel center operating model, while 
Fuel Stop had devoted its energies to building the nation's convenience store chain. By 
entering into a joint venture with a proven performer in the travel center industry, Fuel 
Stop could benefit from the market expertise of Gas Co. 's management. Another motive 
for Fuel Stop to enter into an alliance with Gas Co. was first mover advantages in an 
industry ripe for consolidation. Also, as Fuel Stop ceded operational control of their 
travel center units to Gas Co., Fuel Stop's management could focus on convenience store 
marketing and operations. 
Formation Stage of the Fuel Stop and Gas Co. Joint Venture 
Discussions between Fuel Stop and Gas Co. began in late 2000, as senior 
executives began preliminary inquiries concerning the feasibility of a joint venture 
between the two companies. Management from Fuel Stop and Gas Co. knew each other 
well, as the two companies has more than 30 years of experience with each other, 
including more than 20 years as partners in other coordinated ventures. While the 
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marketing partnership ended amicably in 1988, Fuel Stop continued to serve Gas Co. as a 
wholesale fuel supplier. 
For the months following the beginning of discussions, both firms' managers 
began to determine the relative worth of a joint venture for their respective companies. 
For Fuel Stop in particular, the proposed joint venture offered the ability to accelerate 
their ambitious plans for a nationwide travel center network from a three-year time 
horizon to an immediate reality . Participation in the NewCo LLC joint venture also 
allowed Fuel Stop to join forces with a management team that they knew well, and to tap 
the expertise of a company that had emerged as a true industry leader. In addition, 
NewCo would be a formidable competitor in the nation's primary truck traffic region. 
This 14-state area accounts for nearly two-thirds of the truck-borne freight tonnage in the 
country. Both Fuel Stop and Gas Co. management recognized that to fully realize the 
potential of this market, they needed to establish a coast-to-coast network that would 
permit them to develop fleet accounts with the nation ' s largest carriers. 
At the time of discussions between Fuel Stop and GasCo. management, the truck 
stop industry was highly fragmented . With more than 550 separate companies involved 
in plazas, truck stops and travel centers, there was a definite opportunity for forward 
thinking firms to consolidate their operations to become more efficient and profitable. 
The Fuel Stop/Gas Co. joint venture would take Fuel Stop out of the mix of regional 
players and help establish Gas Co. and NewCo LLC as the national leader in the travel 
center industry A letter of intent was signed on March 15, 2001, beginning a period of 
more intense negotiations. Both companies envisioned a company that would be a 
customer-focused, market-driven organization operating with the highest regard for 
15 
environmental stewardship, ethics and employee safety. As negotiations proceeded, Gas 
Co. and Fuel Stop realized that each parent would immediately enjoy increased accretive 
earnings, amplified cash flows and economic value added. Negotiations continued to go 
smoothly and the joint venture received clearance from the FTC on April 27, 2001, 21 
days earlier than expected. Fuel Stop and Gas Co. signed a definitive joint venture 
agreement on August 17,2001, with the first day of operations for NewCo LLC planned 
for September 1, 2001. 
Adjustment Stage of the Fuel Stop and Gas Co. Joint Venture 
As we stated earlier, when the joint venture enters a period of adjustment, each 
partner begins to define the "scope, domain, and operational purposes of the alliance" 
(Spekman et aI., 1996: 356). As the adjustment stage began, the first concern for the joint 
venture teams from both firms was to finalize the management structure for NewCo LLC. 
While it was decided that Gas Co. would staff the majority of the senior operating 
positions, both companies would be supplying key senior personnel. Fuel Stop 
executives filled key financial positions and also provided the General Counsel for the 
new entity. Outside of corporate positions, Fuel Stop would also be providing field-level 
managers and merchandisers, as well as store level personnel, across the nation. It was 
decided that of the 11,000 total employees of New Co LLC, Fuel Stop would be providing 
3,500. 
It was decided during the adjustment period that the new company's headquarters 
would be located in Gas Co. 's current offices with Gas Co. 's President and Chief 
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Executive Officer also filling both roles for NewCo LLC. Reporting directly to the CEO 
would be Vice-Presidents of Marketing, Operations, Supply and Distribution, and a Chief 
Financial Officer. Reporting directly to the CFO would be NewCo's Controller and 
Treasurer. A General Counsel, staffed by executives from both firms would also assist 
and report to the President and CEO of New Co LLC. Each parent appointed five voting 
members to the Board of Managers, with the new company president sitting as a non-
voting member. Certain decisions involving the new company would need a 100% vote 
from the Board of Managers. Issues that required the unanimous agreement were a 
change in the automatic cash distribution policy, approval of new capital expenditures 
exceeding 100% of historical DD&A, an increase in debt above the established amount, 
appointment or replacement of senior officers, approval of a new business plan, and 
proposed changes in the operating and capital budgets. 
The major governance provisions for the new company were designed to assure 
the best interests of both Fuel Stop and Gas Co. One of the provisions in the bylaws of 
NewCo LLC required quarterly distribution of excess cash and limitations on capital 
expenditures and new borrowings. These provisions were designed to assure that the new 
company is a cash flow generator, and to eliminate any future disputes over these 
fundamental principles. Another provision was that for the first five years, each party 
would retain a right of first refusal, should the other paliner wish to dispose of its interest. 
After five years, Gas Co. has a put option to be exercised at 90 to 95 percent of fair value, 
depending on whether the option is paid in cash or securities. Fuel Stop has a similar call 
option after Year 10, to be exercised at 105 to 110 percent of fair value. Fuel Stop can 
exercise its option if the Board resists attempts to significantly expand or sell the 
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company as an IPO. These provisions are designed to allow us to either grow or 
monetize our investment at our discretion. 
The adjustment stage also saw issues like brand name and marketing discussed 
and resolved. Managers from both Gas Co. and Fuel Stop decided that the integration 
process would focus on re-branding the Fuel Stop travel centers to fully capture the 
market franchise and brand recognition enjoyed by Gas Co. Managers from both parents 
believed that as the Gas Co. operating model was employed across all of New Co LLC's 
units, existing Fuel Stop locations would experience a growth in profitability. NewCo 
LLC planned on spending in excess of $40 million over the course of the next sixteen 
months to conform Fuel Stop locations to the Gas Co. model. Converting all existing 
restaurants in Fuel Stop locations to sector-leading brands was also an important step. 
This provision was added because Fuel Stop management believed that one reason Gas 
Co. leads in this category is their selection of premium brands. The joint venture planners 
also concluded that the retention of the Fuel Stop brand for gasoline sales made sense and 
added that decision as a provision of New Co's bylaws. 
Other provisions were that each partner expects modest capital investment (five 
new sites per year) to maintain and grow the company. The relatively passive growth 
plan was appropriate because the new company's travel center network would be 
essentially complete. Another provision was that the each parent retained all pre-
formation environmental obligations for five years. Thereafter, the obligation shifts to the 
new company at the rate of 20 percent per year, with full responsibility assumed at the 
end of ten years. 
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Conclusions 
As stated earlier, the purpose of this research was to understand if the present 
academic frameworks of joint ventures are accurate models in relation to real world 
occurrences. Academic models of joint venture development have been presented and 
the actual joint venture agreement between Fuel Stop and Gas Co. has been introduced. 
In closing, we need to determine if the models fit this real world agreement and where the 
models could be improved in respect to the Fuel Stop/Gas Co. joint venture. 
Frameworks of joint venture development suggest that the first stage of 
development is the formation phase. This stage is characterized by periods of informal 
and formal discussions between prospective partners in the joint venture. As we examine 
the Fuel Stop and Gas Co. joint venture, we clearly observe a period of formation. Both 
companies were familiar with each other and understood the strategic motives for their 
potential partner. Discussions to begin joint venture negotiations began in late 2000 and 
continued into the first quarter of 200 1. During this time, each firm expressed, both 
internally and to the other partner, their motives for entering into a joint venture. As 
discussions continued, Fuel Stop and Gas Co. realized that a joint venture would allow 
both firms to accomplish their long-term operational objectives. In March of 2001, a 
letter of intent was signed that stated both companies were dedicated to maintaining 
negotiations that would culminate in a joint venture agreement. For the next few months, 
discussions became more formal. From March 2001 until August 2001, issues and 
motives were discussed with a high degree of convergence between managers of both 
firms . The formation period closed with Fuel Stop and Gas Co. signing a definitive joint 
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venture agreement on August 17, 2001 . The observed development of the Fuel Stop/Gas 
Co. partnership closely followed the accepted models of joint venture development. 
At the completion of the formation stage, frameworks of joint venture 
development suggest that firms will enter into a stage of adjustment and planning. At this 
time, structural frameworks and approved processes begin to take shape within the new 
entity. While the focus in the formation stage was on internal motives and potential 
benefits, during the adjustment stage attention is directed toward operations, task 
delegation, and structural integration between all involved partners. Again, the Fuel 
Stop/Gas Co. relationship mirrored the accepted models of joint venture development. 
After the final agreement was signed in August of 200 1, both Fuel Stop and Gas Co. 
began to organize management structure, scope of operations and strategic goals. 
However, one divergence from the model was observed during this period. 
During early negotiations in the formation period, operational issues were also discussed. 
Issues that joint venture development models commonly found in the adjustment stage 
were actually discussed before Fuel Stop and Gas Co. signed the joint venture 
development agreement. While Fuel Stop and Gas Co. focused on management structure 
and operational responsibilities during the adjustment stage, these issues partially 
negotiated during earlier, more informal stages of the joint venture development. The 
fact that such issues were discussed at such an early stage can probably be attributed to 
the nature of the relationship between Gas Co. and Fuel Stop. The companies had an 
existing relationship and were familiar with each other's management teams. This 
comfortable relationship probably led to a relaxed atmosphere during early negotiations 
that fostered an increased sharing of intents, goals, and acceptable processes. 
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In conclusion, the accepted models and frameworks of joint venture development 
proved to be very accurate in regards to the Fuel Stop/Gas Co. joint venture. Motives for 
partnership were shared between both firms at an early stage, discussions moved from an 
informal to a more formal period, and a period of operational structuring followed the 
signing of an official joint venture development agreement. With the only observed 
divergence from the actual joint venture and established joint venture models being an 
abnormal period of structural negotiations in early stages, the accepted frameworks of 
joint venture development proved to be precise in the Fuel Stop and Gas Co. joint venture 
development process. 
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